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BALANCING THE LEGISLATIVE SHIELD: THE
SCOPE OF THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE
John C. Raffetto+
In the interest of legislative autonomy, the Speech or Debate Clause "has
enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity."
1
Article I, Section 6 of the United States Constitution provides that "for any
Speech or Debate in either House, [members of Congress] shall not be
questioned in any other Place. ' 2 This privilege, which sits atop a dual balance,
is an integral aspect of the separation of powers envisioned by the Framers.3 It
has the power to protect the independence of Congress, and the power to
protect corrupt behavior.4
The difficulty in determining the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause
stems from its multi-dimensional nature. Members of Congress have always
done more than just speak and debate on the floor of the House of
Representatives and Senate, and the modem legislative process only increases
the tasks required in lawmaking. 6 That process is further complicated by the
nature of representative government because the members of Congress are
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1. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 256 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) [hereinafter FEDERALIST 48]; see also Sarah Letzkus, Comment, Damned
If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Speech or Debate Clause and Investigating Corruption in
Congress, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1377, 1392-93 (2008).
4. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20 (3d ed. 2000).
5. See Letzkus, supra note 3, at 1391-93. On one side of the debate are "strange
bedfellows," such as Nancy Pelosi and Newt Gingrich, who argue that any search of a
congressional office violates separation of powers principles. Id. at 1391. On the other side are
those, such as Justice Department officials and former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, who
argue that creating an absolute protection transforms congressional offices into "sanctuaries" of
corruption. Id. at 1391-92 (quoting Richard B. Schmitt, Congressman Could Challenge Federal
Possession of Papers: The Justice Department Offers a Concession to Jefferson and Colleagues
Upset over a Raid, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at A4).
6. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (1985) ("It is the proper
duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much
about what it sees."). See generally ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS
AND ITS MEMBERS 30-37 (10th ed. 2006) (discussing constituent demands and career concerns);
DAVID R. MAYHEW, AMERICA'S CONGRESS 67-69, 71-128 (2000) (naming and describing a
vast number of congressional roles).
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neither exclusively representatives nor solely private citizens.7 As a result of
this dual nature, punishing the individual entails punishing the citizens she
represents. 8  In order to protect the interests of his constituents, the
Constitution grants that representative a certain level of protection.
9
Despite the complexity of the issue, defining the scope of the Speech or
Debate Clause is integral to both the investigative and judicial processes.1
°
Interpreting the Clause too broadly exposes the legislature to corruption;
interpreting the Clause too narrowly exposes it to intrusion." One way to
7. Alexander J. Cella, The Doctrine of Legislative Privilege of Freedom of Speech and
Debate: Its Past, Present and Future as a Bar to Criminal Prosecution in the Courts, 2 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 1, 35 (1968). While Alexander Celia is correct in asserting that "[a] legislator, after
all, is merely another citizen when he is not engaged in any way in his legislative activities," his
assertion misses the mark. Id. A representative, while in office, is always both "merely another
citizen" and a representative. HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF
POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 281 (2006). Inhibiting her freedom as an
individual entails restricting her freedom to act as a representative and, in turn, inhibits
Congress's ability to act as a body. See id. (asserting that "the privilege protects both the
autonomy of Congress [as a body] and the interests of its Members").
8. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice, in THE COMPLETE
JEFFERSON: CONTAINING HIS MAJOR WRITINGS, PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED, EXCEPT HIS
LETTERS 698, 702-03 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943) ("When a representative is withdrawn from his
seat by summons, the 47,700 people whom he represents lose their voice in debate and vote ...
when a Senator is withdrawn by summons, his State loses half its voice in debate and vote ....
The enormous disparity of evil admits no comparison.").
9. Id. at 701-02.
10. FEDERALIST 48, supra note 3, at 256 (describing the balance of power between the
branches of government as "the great problem to be solved"); see also Del Quentin Wilber,
Ruling Favors Ex-Congressman and Could Limit Other Investigations, WASH. POST, Feb. 5,
2009, at A3 (suggesting that there has been an increase in claims of Speech or Debate privilege
by members of Congress under investigation). In 2007, Acting-Solicitor General Gregory G.
Garre stated that the Supreme Court should address the scope of the Clause's protection,
otherwise "investigations of corruption in the nation's capital and elsewhere will be seriously and
perhaps fatally stymied." Susan Schmidt, U.S. Asks High Court to Nix 'Speech-or-Debate'
Ruling, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2007, at A3. A recent case has raised the issue of where to draw
the line between legislative and non-legislative behavior. United States v. Renzi, No. CR08-
00212-TUC-DCB (BPV), 2009 WL 995475, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 9, 2009); see also
Tomorrow's Just Your Future Yesterday, http://pointoforder.com/ (Oct. 5, 2009, 18:12 EST)
(analyzing the magistrate's decision not to grant Speech or Debate privilege to "discussions of
future legislative acts"). In contrast to the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Rayburn, the Renzi
court determined that the Speech or Debate Clause provides for a "non-evidentiary use" privilege.
The Renzi Wiretap and FBI Interviews, http://pointoforder.com/ (Oct. 2, 2009, 12:09 EST).
11. See TRIBE, supra note 4, § 5-20 (discussing the importance of confining the scope of the
Clause). Professor Tribe noted:
If the Clause were construed to reach the very periphery of activity incidentally, but
only remotely, relevant to the Representative's or Senator's official role as a member of
Congress... then members and perhaps their staffs as well would be permitted to roam
the land armed with what, for all practical purposes, would be a shield of absolute
immunity greater than that enjoyed even by the President.
Id. Tribe concluded that "the bar represented by the Clause must not be set so high as to
completely preclude judicial review." Id.
[Vol. 59:883
The Scope of the Speech or Debate Clause
frame the issue is to ask: at what point can the executive and judicial branches
question a member of Congress about his actions? Although the Supreme
Court has considered the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause, it has yet to
define an outer limit. 12 As such, legislative history and underlying purposes
play a more significant role than they otherwise might.'
3
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit considered the scope of the legislative privilege in the context of
congressional ethics committee hearings. 14 In 2007, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) contacted then-Representative Tom Feeney as part of its
investigation of lobbyist Jack Abramoff. 15 The FBI was specifically interested
in an Abramoff-funded golf trip to Scotland. 16 The FBI's probe came after the
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (Ethics Committee) investigated
whether Representative Feeney's participation in the trip violated House rules
regarding the acceptance of private funds for personal purposes. 17 As part of
the criminal investigation, the government sought to interview Representative
Feeney; when he refused, the grand jury subpoenaed his lawyers for
documents and testimony related to the Ethics Committee hearing.
18
Representative Feeney's attorneys initially moved to quash the subpoena on
the grounds of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine;
however, Feeney intervened and moved to quash on the additional ground of
privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause.' 9 Although the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion, the court of
12. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972) (considering the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause); see also infra Part I.B-C.
13. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1966); see also infra Part I.B-C.
14. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
15. See Anita Kumar, FBI Asks Feeney about Lobbyist, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 4,
2007, at I1B. Although the court did not specifically name the Florida representative, the
Washington Post revealed the defendant's identity in a February 5, 2009, article. See Wilber,
supra note 10.
16. See Anita Kumar, Rep. Feeney Sought Rule Change Tied to Abramoff" He Joined in a
GOP Letter Criticizing an Energy Policy Revision, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007, at IA
(describing the trip as "a luxury golf trip to Scotland that began with a trans-Atlantic flight on a
private jet and featured twice-daily golf at world-famous locales"). On his blog, Point of Order,
Michael Stem suggested that "although it is not clear from the opinion, it appears that the
investigation may have focused on whether these statements were truthful." D.C. Circuit Issues
Speech or Debate Ruling in the Feeney Case, http://pointoforder.com/ (Oct. 7, 2009, 21:04 EST).
17. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1200 (D.C. Cir 2009); see also COMM. ON
STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 87-119 (2008) (detailing
restrictions and conditions on travel); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES R.
XXV(5)(b)(I)(A)-(B) (2009) (defining the circumstances under which reimbursement constitutes
a prohibited gift).
18. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1201.
19. Id.
2010]
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appeals reversed, holding in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas that the Speech or
Debate Clause protected Feeney's committee testimony.
20
In ruling that the Speech or Debate Clause shielded Representative Feeney's
testimony from the government, the court relied on a test derived from two
prior decisions: Ray v. Proxmire and United States v. Rose.21  Under the
Ray/Rose test, testimony before the Ethics Committee is protected when it
relates to official or legislative matters, but it is not protected when the
testimony relates to personal matters.22  Despite concurring in the decision,
Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh urged the court to reconsider its use of the
Ray/Rose test.
23
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas demonstrates both the interpretive and political
complexities of defining the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause. Judge
Kavanaugh's concurrence urged the court to reconsider the way it approaches
the legislative privilege, 25 and this Note will address Judge Kavanaugh's
demand. Beginning with an examination of Supreme Court precedent, this
Note discusses the genesis, codification, and underlying purposes of the
Speech or Debate Clause. After considering the Clause's legislative and
judicial history, this Note sets forth the D.C. Circuit's current test and
examines its strengths and weaknesses. Next, this Note addresses the majority
and concurring opinions of In re Grand Jury Subpoenas. This Note then
analyzes the benefits of a test that protects the purposes of the Speech or
Debate Clause while preventing abuse of the immense power that it creates.
Supreme Court precedent and the history and underlying purposes of the
privilege require a test that protects the actions of members of Congress only
when those acts fall within the scope of the members' legislative capacity.
This Note concludes that because both the Ray/Rose test and Judge
Kavanaugh's suggested rule fail to achieve this goal, the D.C. Circuit should
adopt a new test.
20. Id. This ruling did not prohibit the government from investigating actions outside
Representative Feeney's testimony before the committee and thus raises the question of what
components of the testimony are actually protected.
21. Id. at 1203.
22. Id. In both Ray v. Proxmire and United States v. Rose, the difference between
legislative and non-legislative action was the determining consideration. See United States v.
Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(per curiam). For a more detailed discussion of these two cases, see infra Part I.D.
23. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 751 F.3d at 1203 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
24. See Wilber, supra note 10 (noting that because of the case's temporal proximity to the
opinion in United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, Wash., D.C. 20515, 497
F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), commentators view the ruling as the D.C. Circuit siding "with
Congress in its fight with the Justice Department").
25. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 751 F.3d at 1203 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Posting of
Mike Scarcella to the BLT: The Blog of Legal Times, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/07/
dc-circuit-judge-calls-for-en-banc-court-to-review-speechordebate-protection.htmI (July 9, 2009,
07:54 EST).
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I. THE BLURRED SCOPE: THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE IN SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the use of testimony
given in congressional committee hearings, it has begun to trace the extent of
26the Speech or Debate Clause. Three issues permeate the discussion of the
legislative privilege: separation of powers,27  the dual identity of
representatives, 28 and the freedom to act. 2These three issues are inseverable
from questions about the extent of the legislative privilege because they are the
principles that underlie the privilege's existence. Therefore, the Supreme
Court has considered these issues, along with the history of the privilege, when
making its decisions. 3 1 As a result of these considerations, the Court has, with
some variation, interpreted the Clause broadly, limiting it only to curtail abuse
of power and imposition on individual rights.
A. Legislative History: A Passage without Debate
In contrast to the slow and politically complicated creation of the English
privilege,33 the Speech or Debate Clause became part of the United States
26. See infra Parts I.B-C.
27. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) ("The Speech or Debate
Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech,
debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch.").
28. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (1 Will.)
1, 27 (Mass. 1808) ("These privileges are thus secured, not with the intention of protecting the
members against prosecution for their own benefit, but to support the rights of the people, by
enabling their representatives to execute the functions of their office without fear of prosecutions,
civil or criminal.").
29. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660; see also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81
(1966). In particular, the Court concluded that while the need to bar private suits in order to
avoid drains on representatives' time is an aspect of the privilege, it is not the only aspect
Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180-81. The Court opined that the history of the privilege reveals that the
primary motivation behind the development of the privilege was "to prevent intimidation by the
executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." Id at 181.
30. See Celia, supra note 7, at 3-10 (discussing these issues in the context of the English
Parliament's analogous privilege).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516-18 (1972) (considering the three
issues in conjunction with the privilege's history); Johnson, 383 U.S. at 177-79 (discussing the
history and development of the privilege).
32. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516 ("Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be read
broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch, but no
more than the statutes we apply, was its purpose to make Members of Congress super-citizens,
immune from criminal responsibility.").
33. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 177-78 (noting that the Speech or Debate Clause as it appears
in the Constitution has its roots in the English Bill of Rights and the struggle between the English
Parliament and Monarchy); Cella, supra note 7, at 4 (discussing the conflict that led to
Parliament's legislative privilege). The English Bill of Rights of 1689 demonstrates the severity
of the conflict leading up to the adoption of the English privilege. Amid references to the
Glorious Revolution, the abdication of King James II, and Parliament's coronation of William
2010]
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Constitution without recorded debate. 34 The distinction between the English
and American rights leads to differing judicial interpretations of the legislative
privilege. 35 As a result, the Court has determined that its task is "to apply the
Clause in such a way as to insure the independence of the legislature without
altering the historic balance of the three co-equal branches of Government."
36
Describing the constraints of interpretation in this way, the Court has
demonstrated that, while the English and American privileges may share an
underlying purpose, their application is not uniform. 37 This distinction is quite
important because the English privilege is extremely broad. 38
B. The Machinations of the Privilege
Although the text of the Clause only refers to "Speech or Debate," the Court
has interpreted these words as inclusive of legislative activity, whether spoken
or not. 39 Likewise, the Court has refused to limit the protection afforded by the
privilege to merely being "questioned in any other Place. ' 4° Instead, the Court
has interpreted the Clause "broadly to effectuate its purposes.
',4
and Mary, Parliament codified its legislative privilege, stating: "the freedom of speech, and
debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or
place out of parliament." ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS, 1689, 1 W. & M., 2d sess., ch. 2, cl. 2. It is
from these words that Article I, Section 6, is derived. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 177.
34. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 177 ("The Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution was
approved at the Constitutional Convention without discussion and without opposition.").
35. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508 (noting that the Clause "must be interpreted in light of the
American experience, and in the context of the American constitutional scheme of government
rather than the English parliamentary scheme"); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
201 (1880) (explaining that "while the framers of the Constitution did not adopt the lex et
consuetude of the English Parliament as a whole, they did incorporate such parts of it, and with it
such privileges of Parliament, as they thought proper to be applied to the two Houses of
Congress"); Leon R. Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Meaning
and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 960, 962 (1951) (noting that the Speech or Debate Clause was a
product of the judicial role of the House of Lords and the lack of that power in the House of
Commons). The Court, in Brewster, noted that "Parliament is the supreme authority, not a
coordinated branch. Our speech or debate privilege was designed to preserve legislative
independence, not supremacy." Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508.
36. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508.
37. Id. at 518-19 (noting, for example, that Parliament, as a body with the power to
adjudicate, is able to punish members otherwise protected by the privilege in a way that Congress
is not).
38. See JEFFERSON, supra note 8, at 701-02 (describing the broad parliamentary privileges
and explaining the Framers' decision to narrow the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause).
39. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204; see also Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180 ("[T]he legislative
privilege will be read broadly to effectuate its purpose.").
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see also infra Part i.B.2.
41. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180.
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1. Defining the Phrase "Speech or Debate"
In United States v. Johnson, the Court considered a representative's attempt
42to exclude evidence in his conspiracy trial. As part of its case, the
government attempted to show that Representative Thomas F. Johnson
received payment in exchange for reading a speech, which was beneficial to
independent savings and loan associations, on the House floor.4 3 Although the
government used evidence of his financial transactions at trial, Representative
Johnson challenged only the use of evidence related to his motive for
delivering the speech.44  The Court held that the government, by using
evidence relating to the House speech, violated the Speech or Debate Clause.
4
The Court also held that "'[t]he claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy
the privilege. ,,
46
Discussing English precedent, the Court found that the protection of the
Speech or Debate Clause must extend beyond the mere content of a speech to
its motives and preparation because allowing inquiry into those aspects would
"necessarily contravene[] the Speech or Debate Clause. ' '47 More importantly,
the Court made it clear that the government's introduction of evidence
regarding the speech and its motivations was not "the [lone] constitutional
infirmity infecting [the] prosecution"; the act of inquiring into the text and
motivation of the speech also violated the protection of the Speech or Debate
48Clause. Centered on the principle of separation of powers, the analysis in
42. Id. at 172; see also Celia, supra note 7, at 31-33. The Department of Justice brought
charges against Representative Johnson under the federal conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. §
281, and a federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 170-71. Johnson
and two other representatives were found guilty of receiving money from a Maryland savings and
loan institution for the purpose of "exerting influence on the Department of Justice to obtain the
dismissal of pending indictments of the loan company and its officers on mail fraud charges." Id.
at 171.
43. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 171-72.
44. Id. at 172. The limited appeal suggests that the Court was correct in determining that
the Speech or Debate Clause would not protect these financial records. Id.
45. Id at 184-85. The Court noted that the prosecution "question[ed] the manner of
preparation and the precise ingredients of the speech," as well as "the motives for giving it." Id.
at 175-76.
46. Id. at 180 (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951)). The Clause would
provide little protection if it could be circumvented merely by claiming that a member of
Congress engaged in criminal conduct. Furthermore, the determination of guilt before trial is an
impossible antecedent inquiry. It might be tempting to argue that because no illegal act can fall
into the category of legislative conduct, any claim of criminal activity would strip away the
privilege-but such an argument presumes guilt. If the defendant congressman is innocent-as
presumed under the law before conviction-then one cannot presume that any charged criminal
activity is automatically outside the scope of legislative conduct.
47. Id. at 184-85. In Ex Parte Wilson, the court denied a motion to prosecute members of
the House of Lords, holding that "the motives or intentions of members of either House cannot be
inquired into by criminal proceedings with respect to anything they may do or say in the House."
Id. at 183 (quoting Ex Parte Wilson, (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 573, 577).
48. Id. at 176-77.
2010]
Catholic University Law Review
Johnson demonstrates the Court's willingness to reach beyond the text of the
Clause in order to effectuate its purposes. V
In order to prevent any access to protected material, the Court also extended
the protection of the privilege to congressional aides. 5° This expansion was
based on an increasingly important factor in legislative-privilege
jurisprudence: the nature of the "modem legislative process." 51  Because the
modem legislative process requires constant attention, "it is literally
impossible . . . for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks
without the help of aides and assistants." 52 Although some may argue-as the
government did in Gravel v. United States-that only serving as a Senator or
Representative confers the legislative privilege, 53 such an argument presents
54too narrow a view of the purposes underlying the privilege. Just as
constituents lose their voice when their representative must answer
allegations, 5 so too would their voice be weakened if the representative could
not confide in his staff.
2. Interpreting the Phrase "Questioned in Any Other Place"
In a case involving the first ever search of a sitting Congressman's office,
the D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of whether procedures used by the
executive branch "were sufficiently protective of the legislative privilege
created by the Speech or Debate Clause." 56  The Department of Justice
49. See generally Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880) (discussing the
extension of the privilege to acts outside of speech or debate because of the centrality of those
acts to the work of Congress); see also James Walton McPhillips, "Saturday Night's Alrightfor
Fighting ": Congressman William Jefferson, the Saturday Night Raid, and the Speech or Debate
Clause, 42 GA. L. REV. 1085, 1092-93 (2008) (defining the historical purposes of the Clause as
promoting unfettered speech for members of Congress and delineating the separation of powers).
50. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (rejecting the government's
argument that "because the Speech or Debate Clause confers a privilege only upon 'Senators and
representatives,' aides [have] no valid claim to constitutional immunity from grand jury inquiry").
In Gravel, the Court found that "for the purpose of construing the privilege a Member and his
aide are to be 'treated as one."' Id. (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 761 (1st Cir.




54. See The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and Their Employees, 77 YALE L.J. 366, 384
(1967) [hereinafter The Scope ofImmunity] (positing that hinging the legislative privilege "not on
the dignity of the high political office, but the nature of the functions exercised" makes judicial
intervention inevitable).
55. See JEFFERSON, supra note 8, at 702-03.
56. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, Wash., D.C. 20515, 497 F.3d
654, 655, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Philip Shenon, F.B.I. Contends Lawmaker Hid Bribe in
Freezer, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at Al. A federal jury in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia convicted former Representative Jefferson of eleven of the sixteen
counts on which he was indicted. Jerry Markon & Brigid Schulte, Jefferson Convicted in Bribery
Scheme: Ex-Congressman Guilty of 11 Counts, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2009, at A2. Judge T.S.
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obtained a warrant to search then-Representative William Jefferson's office for
evidence of fraud and bribery.57 The eighteen-hour search was executed on the
58evening of May 20, 2006. During the search, the FBI barred Representative
Jefferson, his attorney, and counsel for the House of Representatives from the
office.
5 9
The court found the Justice Department's argument-that procedures were
in place to protect legislative material-unconvincing, and held that "seriatim
initial reviews by agents of the Executive of a sitting Member's congressional
office are inconsistent with the privilege under the Clause."60 The court based
its opinion on two justifications for the legislative privilege: freedom to
perform legislative acts without fear of suit and freedom from investigative
intrusion. Just as the Supreme Court held in Johnson, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that pre-trial requirements such as discovery were also an
unconstitutional intrusion because "the legislative process is disrupted by the
disclosure of legislative material, regardless of the use to which the disclosed
materials are put."62  Concluding that the intrusive nature of required
disclosure alone, regardless of the eventual use of the documents, violated the
Speech or Debate Clause, the court held that "a search that allows agents of the
Executive to review privileged materials without the Member's consent
violates the Clause." 63 Thus, the court found that the Speech or Debate Clause
Ellis III sentenced Representative Jefferson to thirteen years in prison. Jerry Markon, Jefferson
Gets 13 Years in Bribe Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2009, at A2.
57. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656.
58. Id. at 657; Shenon, supra note 56; see also Brian Reimels, Note, United States v.
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2113: A Midnight Raid on the Constitution or Business as
Usual?, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 293 (2007) (describing the scandal as involving "[a] leather
briefcase, cold hard cash (literally), and a telecommunications initiative in Africa").
59. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 662.
60. Id. at 663, 666-67.
61. Id. at 660. Specifically, the court noted that, in order to operate independently, the
legislature must be free from "'the distractions of private civil litigation or the periods of criminal
prosecution."' Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 400, 420
(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
62. Id. But see United States v. Renzi, No. CR08-00212-TUC-DCB (BPV), 2009 WL
995474, at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 13, 2009) (discussing Rayburn and finding that the Speech or Debate
Clause provides a protection against evidentiary use, not a protection against disclosure).
63. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 661, 663. The court ordered the Justice Department to return "all
legislative materials ... protected by the Speech or Debate Clause." Id. at 666. On his blog,
Michael Stem reported that Representative Jefferson "is seeking a writ of certiorari on the
question of 'whether the indictment of a Member of Congress, although facially valid, should be
dismissed when evidence privileged under the Speech or Debate Clause was used in the grand
jury to obtain the indictment."' Jefferson's Cert Petition on Speech or Debate, http://pointof
order.com/ (Feb. 20, 2009, 22:02 EST). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rejected Representative Jefferson's argument that the mere mention of evidence covered
by the Speech or Debate Clause taints an indictment, finding that "a grand jury will not be
deemed biased solely because it heard some evidence relating to congressional speech." United
States v. Jefferson, 546 F.3d 300, 313 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009).
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is not solely a shield against the use of certain evidence at trial, but also a
shield against forced disclosure.
64
C. Probing the Extent of the Clause
Although the Court has embraced a broad view of the Clause in many cases,
it has also set limits on the privilege's reach. 65 These limits are a product of
both the preservation of the system of coordinate branches and a desire to
prevent damage to individual rights.
66
In an early case, the Court considered the assertion of the Speech or Debate
Clause defense by House members who ordered the arrest of a private citizen
for contempt. 67  After Hallett Kilbourn refused to appear before a House
committee, the House of Representatives passed a resolution ordering its
Sergeant at Arms to effect his arrest.68 The Sergeant at Arms, John Thompson,
arrested Kilboum and placed him in the Washington, D.C., jail.69 Although the
Court focused much of its opinion on Congress's right to issue arrest warrants,
it also considered whether the legislators who passed the resolution were liable
in tort for Kilbourn's arrest.70 After setting out the general principle that "the
person who procures the arrest of another by judicial process, by instituting
and conducting the proceedings, is liable in an action for false imprisonment,"
the Court explained that if the resolution had been passed "in any ordinary
tribunal, without probable cause, they would have been liable for the action
which they had thus promoted.' Despite this general principle, the Court
found that those members of the House who passed the resolution were not
liable because they were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.72  In
distinguishing between the act of passing a resolution and the act of effecting
64. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 656. But see Reimels, supra note 58, at 336-38 (arguing that the
court's reasoning was "unconvincing" and that its decision left several unanswered questions).
65. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972) (noting the importance of
limiting the protection that the Speech or Debate Clause affords).
66. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201 (1880). The Court relied on the
Massachusetts case Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. (3 Tyng) (1803), because it was "unable to find any
decision of a Federal court on this clause of section 6 or article ." Id. at 203-04.
68. Id. at 172-73.
69. Id. at 176-77.
70. Id. at 199-200.
71. Id. at200-01.
72. Id. at 205 ("[Tjhe plea [of legislative privilege] set up by those of the defendants who
were members of the House is a good defence, and the judgment of the court overruling the
demurrer to it and giving judgment for those defendants will be affirmed."). While briefly noting
that there might be some circumstances "of an extraordinary character, for which the members
who take part in the act may be held legally responsible," the Court did not rule on that issue
because any holding defining those circumstances would have been speculative. Id at 204-05.
In contrast, the Court found that the Sergeant at Arms was not protected by the Clause. Id. at 205.
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an arrest, Kilbourn represents the beginning of a division between legislative
and non-legislative action.
73
The Court further delineated the distinction between legislative and non-
legislative action in Gravel v. United States, in which it considered a Speech or
Debate Clause challenge to a federal investigation into the dissemination of the
Pentagon Papers.74  Although Senator Mike Gravel argued that his
transmission of the Pentagon Papers to a third-party publisher should be
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court held that such an act was
not privileged.75 In holding that Senator Gravel's behavior was not protected,
the Court considered the extent to which the Senator's act was "an integral part
of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members
participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect
to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House. ' 76 It found that the private publication of information is not protected
by the Speech or Debate Clause because it is "in no way essential to the
deliberations of the Senate."
77
Arguing that the act of disseminating information from congressional
hearings was a historic duty of members of Congress, the dissenting justices in
73. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 315 (1973) (noting that while the Speech or Debate
Clause protects members of Congress when they vote, it "no more insulates legislative
functionaries carrying out such nonlegislative directives than it protected the Sergeant at Arms in
Kilbourn v. Thompson when, at the direction of the House, he made an arrest that the courts
subsequently found to be 'without authority"' (quoting Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 200)). The
distinction is often described as being between legislative and private action, but as Kilbourn
demonstrates, some acts are neither legislative nor private. This creates a separate category of
activities that can be called "official." In Doe v. McMillan, the Court discussed the difference
between legislative conduct, which is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, and official
conduct, which is sometimes protected by the doctrine of official immunity. Id. at 318-25; see
also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130 (1979) (finding that while the Speech or Debate
Clause protects legislative conduct, it does not extend to those actions which fall into the scope of
official conduct). For cases concerning the doctrine of official immunity, see Howard v. Lyons,
360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959), and Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1959).
74. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1972). The Pentagon Papers-formally
titled History of the United States Decision-Making Process in Viet Nam Policy-was a classified
study conducted by the Department of Defense. Id. at 608. Those subpoenaed, including a
member of Senator Gravel's staff, were called to testify about the Senator's involvement in a
planned publication of the study. Id. at 608-10.
75. Id. at 622. Senator Gravel relied on an English case, Wason v. Walter, (1868) 4
L.R.Q.B. 73, to support the proposition that his republication should be protected. Id. at 623 n. 14.
The court in Wason held that a publisher was not liable "for an accurate republication of a debate
in the House of Lords." Id. (citing Wason, 4 L.R.Q.B. 73). The Court disagreed with Senator
Gravel, finding that the decision in Wason was not based on the legislative privilege. Id.
76. Id. at 625.
77. Id.; see also Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State
Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 221, 294-96 (2003) (discussing the integral nature of
gathering evidence to formulate "a legislative position").
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Gravel further entrenched the distinction between legislative and non-
legislative acts.78  Favoring a broad interpretation of the Clause, Justice
William Douglas asserted that informing the public is, in fact, a legislative
role .7
Likewise, Justice William Brennan found the majority's interpretation too
narrow-in particular, he considered the majority's distinction between "words
spoken in debate or written in congressional reports" and the dissemination of
information from hearings contrived. 80 Justice Brennan argued that "it is plain
that Senator Gravel's dissemination of material, placed by him in the record of
a congressional hearing, is itself legislative activity protected by the privilege
of speech or debate." 8  Although both Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan
sought to expand the definition of legislative action beyond that embraced by
the majority, they agreed with the majority's position that protection must be
hinged on the legislative role. 82  The interplay between Kilbourn and the
majority and dissenting opinions in Gravel suggests that the scope of the
legislative privilege reaches only as far as the extent of the legislative role.83
D. Ray/Rose: The Current D.C. Circuit Test
In the context of testimony before a congressional ethics committee, the
D.C. Circuit uses a test based on two cases: Ray v. Proxmire and United States
v. Rose. 84 In line with the Supreme Court's legislative-function limitation, this
78. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 649-50, 659-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 639 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("'It is the proper duty of a representative body to
look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees."' (quoting
WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY tN AMERICAN POLITICS 303
(1885))). Justice Douglas illustrated this point through reference to instances of governmental
suppression of the media. Id. at 641-42 ("[A]s has been revealed by such expos6s as the
Pentagon Papers, the My Lai massacres, the Gulf of Tonkin 'incident,' and the Bay of Pigs
invasion, the Government usually suppresses damaging news but highlights favorable news.").
80. Id. at 648-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Senator Gravel's reading of the
Pentagon Papers in the Senate would have been protected, "[y]et because he sought a wider
audience, to publicize information deemed relevant to matters pending before his own committee,
the Senator suddenly loses his immunity and is exposed to grand jury investigation and possible
prosecution for the republication").
81. Id. at 659-60. Justice Brennan bolstered his argument with the words of James Wilson,
one of the drafters of the Speech or Debate Clause, who noted "'[t]hat the conduct and
proceedings of representatives should be as open as possible to the inspection of those whom they
represent, seems to be, in republican government, a maxim, of whose truth or importance the
smallest doubt cannot be entertained."' Id. at 656 (quoting 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 422
(Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967)).
82. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
83. See Charles W. Johnson, Comment, The Doctrine of Official Immunity: An Unnecessary
Intrusion into Speech or Debate Clause Jurisprudence, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 535, 573 (1994)
(concluding that, to the extent that a legislative privilege exists independent of Article I, Section
6, any legislative privilege "must not extend beyond the Speech or Debate Clause").
84. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1202-03 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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test seeks to determine whether the ethics inquiry is centered on a
representative's legislative acts.
8 5
1. Legislative Capacity: Ray v. Proxmire
In Ray, the D.C. Circuit considered a Speech or Debate Clause defense to a
libel action against Senator William Proxmire. 86 Senator Proxmire's wife ran a
D.C. tour company named "Whirl-Around Inc." 87  Appellant Ray, who
operated a competing tour company, alleged that Senator and Mrs. Proxmire
had tortiously interfered with her business.8 8 Specifically, she contended that
Senator Proxmire had "libeled [her] and disparaged her business in a letter to
Senator [Howard] Cannon, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on
Standards and Conduct."8 9 Finding that the letter was a "respon[se] to a Senate
inquiry into an exercise of [Proxmire's] official powers," the court dismissed
the libel claim. 90 Furthermore, the court noted that, in responding to Senator
Cannon, Senator Proxmire "was engaged in a matter central to the jurisdiction
of the Senate." 9' Because Senator Proxmire did not disseminate the letter to
anyone other than Senator Cannon, and because the letter did not pass beyond
the scope of Senator Cannon's inquiry, the court found that the letter should be
92
protected. Thus, Ray, as half of the D.C. Circuit's test, stands for the
proposition that when a legislator responds to an ethics complaint related to
legislative activities, his actions are protected.
2. Private Action: United States v. Rose
In United States v. Rose, Representative Charles G. Rose argued that his
testimony before the House Ethics Committee was protected by the Speech or
Debate Clause.93  In 1986, the committee investigated a claim that
Representative Rose violated the Ethics in Government Act by impermissibly
85. Id. at 1202 (discussing the parameters established by Johnson and Gravel).
86. Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam). The scope of the
charges in Ray extended beyond the charge of libel: the main thrust of the suit involved a tortious
interference claim against the Senator's wife. Id.
87. Id. at 999-1000.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1000. The letter was a response to Ray's accusation that the Senator "had
arranged for Whirl-Around to make use of Senate rooms on its tours." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court also reiterated the reasoning from Tenney and Johnson that "' [t]he claim
of unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege."' Id. (quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 377 (1951)).
92. Id. The court's conclusion that Proxmire had not "disseminated his letter to anyone
whose knowledge of its contents was not justified by legitimate legislative needs," highlights its
lack of concern about the member's motives. Id. The court's concern was not the content of the
letter, but rather its purpose. Id. Because the letter was a response to a legitimate exercise of a
legislative function, the contents of the letter were immaterial.
93. United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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taking campaign funds for personal use.9 4  After its investigation, the
committee issued a report concluding that Representative Rose had violated
both the House rules and the Ethics Act. 95 Consequently, the committee issued
a letter of reproval.96 In addition to this proceeding, the Department of Justice
initiated its own investigation of Representative Rose's actions, despite the
committee's request that no civil action be brought.97 The district court denied
Representative Rose's motion to exclude the testimony he gave before the
committee because the subject of that testimony-his personal financial
activities-did not fall within the scope of his legislative capacity.
98
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit considered the constitutionality of the Justice
Department's use of Representative Rose's committee testimony.99 The court
first considered the history of the Speech or Debate Clause and noted that the
Clause was a "necessary guarantor of legislative independence."'' 00 Citing
Thomas Jefferson, the court noted that the power of the privilege was hedged
94. Id. at 183 (quoting 2 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 702(a)) (internal citations omitted) (discussing
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which required "Members of Congress [to] file a 'full and
complete' financial disclosure report .... [The] report must include, inter alia, the 'source, type,
and amount or value' of non-U.S. government income aggregating $100 or more; gifts from a
non-relative aggregating $100 or more; and liabilities to creditors over $10,000, except certain
secured loans" (citations omitted)).
95. Id. The court noted:
Specifically, it found that he had (a) "borrowed from his campaign on eight separate
occasions from 1978 to 1985, in violation of House Rule XLIII, clause 6"; (b) "pledged
a $75,000 certificate of deposit belonging to his campaign on a personal loan . . . in
violation of House Rule XLIII, clause 6"; (c) "failed to list as liabilities to his campaign
the borrowings referred to [in (a)] on his Financial Disclosure Statements" for the years
1982 through 1986, in violation of the Ethics Act and House Rule XLIV, clause 2; and
(d) "failed to list liabilities to certain financial institutions on his Financial Disclosure
Statements, in violation of the [Act]."
Id. at 184 (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 100-526, at 25 (1988)).
96. Id
97. Id. The dual investigation raises an issue tangential to the legislative privilege:
Congress's power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings [and] punish its members for
disorderly Behaviour." U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 2. One motivation behind this recommendation
was the committee's finding that while Representative Rose had violated House rules and the
Ethics Act, he had not done so "knowingly and willfully." Rose, 28 F.3d at 184. Furthermore,
the committee argued that intervention by the Justice Department would undermine the power of
Congress to sanction its members under Article I, Section 5. Id. at 184-85. The Justice
Department disregarded the committee's request and brought suit against Representative Rose on
May 19, 1989. Id. at 185. As part of that investigation, Acting-Assistant Attorney General Brent
Hatch sent the committee a letter seeking its views regarding a potential civil suit. Id. at 184. In
this letter, he explained that the Attorney General was not limited by Congress's proceeding. Id.
98. Rose, 28 F.3d at 185 (citing United States v. Rose, 790 F. Supp. 340, 340 (D.D.C.
1992)). The district court's analysis raises an unsettled aspect of the D.C. Circuit test: is the
subject of the ethics committee testimony or the forum in which it takes place dispositive? The
court stated, "we focus on what Congressman Rose said, not where he said it." Id at 188. This
focal point seems inconsistent with Ray. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
99. Rose, 28 F.3d at 186.
100. Id. at 186-87.
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by "the legislative sphere." 10 1 Relying on Johnson and Gravel, the court
reasoned that the privilege must be limited to a member's legislative capacity
in order to promote the purposes of the privilege "without unduly trampling
'the rights of private individuals."'0 2 With this limitation on the legislative
privilege delineated, the court found that the Speech or Debate Clause did not
protect Representative Rose's testimony because "[t]he testimony was not
addressed to a pending bill or to any other legislative matter; it was, instead,
the Congressman's defense of his handling of various personal financial
transactions."' 3 Rose thus stands as Ray's opposite because the subject of the
disclosed information was private, and therefore non-legislative. The D.C.
Circuit's combined Ray/Rose test incorporates both extremes by considering
the nature of the member's testimony-specifically, asking whether the
member's conduct was legislative.'
0 4
II. THE TEST IN ACTION: INRE GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS
As part of a larger 2007 investigation into the actions of Jack Abramoff, the
Department of Justice began to investigate Representative Tom Feeney's
overseas golf trip.1° 5 The appeal in Representative Feeney's case presented a
second opportunity in as many years for the D.C. Circuit to consider the scope
of the Speech or Debate Clause.' 0 6 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas presented an
issue more narrow than that previously presented: whether testimony given
during a congressional committee hearing is privileged under the Speech or
Debate Clause.1
07
A. The Majority Application of the Ray/Rose Test
To determine whether the district court properly denied the motion to quash
the grand jury subpoenas for testimony given by Representative Feeney before
the House Ethics Committee, the D.C. Circuit turned to the Ray/Rose test.
0 8
Investigating a claim that Representative Feeney violated House Rule 25,
clause 5(b), by accepting private funding for a vacation, the committee "invited
the congressman to respond to the allegations and recommended his response
include details about the trip and about his understanding as to the sources of
101. Id. at 187.
102. Id. (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624 n. 15 (1972)).
103. Id. at 188. The court went on to say that "Congressman Rose was acting as a witness to
facts relevant to a congressional investigation of his private conduct; he was not acting in a
legislative capacity." Id.
104. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
105. Kumar, supra note 15.
106. Wilber, supra note 10. The probe into Representative Feeney's trip was under way
when the D.C. Circuit reached its decision in United States v. Rayburn House Office Building,
Room 2113, Washington, D.C. 20515. See Schmidt, supra note 10.
107. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1200-01.
108. Id. at 1202-03.
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payment therefor."' 0 9 Representative Feeney's lawyers presented details about
the trip and asserted the representative's belief that it was "a privately
sponsored fact-finding trip."' 1 The committee found that "the trip did not
comply with House rules and [the representative] ha[d] agreed to resolve the
matter by paying the cost of the trip to the United States Treasury."'
When a federal grand jury began a subsequent investigation, a government
attorney told Representative Feeney's lawyers that he wanted to interview the
representative about certain statements.' 2 When Representative Feeney did
not comply with the request, his attorneys were subpoenaed "for testimony and
documents related to their representation of the congressman before the Ethics
Committee and their preparation of the submissions made on his behalf."
113
Although his attorneys sought to avoid the subpoenas through the attorney-
client privilege as well as the work-product doctrine, Representative Feeney
"intervened, adopted his lawyers' arguments, and moved to quash on the
additional ground that the documents and testimony were protected from
discovery by the Speech or Debate Clause." 114 Following the district court's
denial of this motion, Representative Feeney filed for an immediate appeal on
the issue of legislative privilege. 115
The court began its analysis by noting that the role of the privilege is to
maintain the balance of power between the coordinate branches, that the
privilege must be construed in such a way as to avoid damaging the rights of
individuals, and that its scope is co-terminus with legislative acts. The
109. Id. at 1201.
110. Id. The lawyers' submission also detailed the representative's "understanding of who
was sponsoring the trip and his recollection that he paid personally for his recreational activities."
Id.
11. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. Ruling on Representative Feeney's motion, the district court found that "the
congressman was not acting in his legislative capacity but in his personal capacity as a witness to
facts relevant to the Committee's investigation." Id.
115. Id. at 1201-02. The appellate court noted that the defendant had the right to an
immediate appeal "under the collateral order doctrine." Id. (citing United States v. Rostenkowski,
59 F.3d 1291, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). If immediate appeals were not available in legislative
privileges cases, the Speech or Debate Clause would lose much of its power. Requiring a trial
and allowing evidence of potentially protected testimony would force upon the member of
Congress an intrusion by at least one other branch of government and distract him from the task
of representing his constituents. See Wilber, supra note 10 (concluding that "the court may have
wanted to halt 'imminent' grand jury proceedings involving Feeney").
116. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1202. The district court, interpreting the same
precedent, found that "a congressman may assert the Speech or Debate Clause to bar compelled
disclosure of testimony or documents from his attorney about the congressman's legislative acts."
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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court, applying the Ray/Rose test, sought to determine whether Representative
Feeney's act fell within the ambit of his legislative capacity." 7
In response to the government's argument that because the accusation
involved a "recreational vacation," Representative Feeney was acting outside
of his legislative capacity when he responded to the House Ethics Committee
inquiry, the court noted that the representative's guilt had not been
established.' Turning its attention to the House Ethics Committee's
communication with Representative Feeney, the court asserted that the letter-
describing the purpose of the investigation-"might well have signaled an
inquiry into a wholly personal transaction."'1 19 Despite the initial possibility of
"a wholly personal transaction," the court determined that Representative
Feeney's classification of the trip as a fact-finding excursion returned the
committee's inquiry to the sphere of legislative capacity. 20 Although the court
left open the possibility that the trip was "a privately sponsored vacation," it
found the case more factually similar to Ray than to Rose, and reversed the
denial of the congressman's motion to quash.
B. Challenging the Ray/Rose Test: Judge Kavanaugh 's Concurrence
Judge Kavanaugh, concurring in the judgment, urged the court to reconsider
the Ray/Rose test.' Analyzing the Speech or Debate Clause from a textualist
perspective, Judge Kavanaugh asserted that the court, in Ray and Rose,
surpassed the permissible scope of its inquiry. 123 Judge Kavanaugh argued that
Ray "watered down the constitutional text and decided that a Member's speech
in a congressional disciplinary proceeding warrants protection only if the
legislative committee is inquiring into a Member's 'exercise of his official
powers.""' 24 He suggested that, in addition to these failings, the Ray/Rose testwas inefficient. 125
117. Id. at 1203.
118. Id. The government argued that the trip was purely recreational, thus the privilege did
not apply because a recreational trip was not within the scope of the legislative capacity. Id.





122. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 1205 (arguing that, because the speech in Ray and Rose occurred before a House
committee, the court's inquiry "need have gone no further").
124. Id. at 1203-04 (quoting Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 990, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per
curiam)).
125. Id. at 1204 ("The Ray/Rose test not only distorts the constitutional text, but also creates
a host of practical and jurisprudential difficulties-perhaps best exemplified by the fact that Ray
and Rose reached different results on very similar facts.").
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In reaching his conclusion, Judge Kavanaugh relied on the same precedent
and historic purpose as the majority.' 26 While referencing the English Bill of
Rights, Kilbourn, and Gravel, Judge Kavanaugh argued that a broad
interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause is in line with the Framers' intent
to protect legislative independence. 127 This textual command, he asserted, was
designed to preserve the independence of the coordinate branches of
government. 128 Judge Kavanaugh further argued that the "Supreme Court has
arguably extended the protections of the Speech or Debate Clause beyond what
its plain text otherwise might suggest . . . [b]ut . . . has not interpreted the
Clause to provide less protection than the text establishes."' 29 Based on this
reasoning, he concluded that the court could not now restrict the privilege by
allowing the judiciary to probe the underlying causes of a congressionalinvestigation.' 30
Judge Kavanaugh did not base his call to reconsider the Ray/Rose test on
history alone; he emphasized that Congress's power to investigate its members
is enshrined in Article I, Section 5, which grants the House and Senate power
to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."
' 131
Judge Kavanaugh reasoned that any procedure under this authority should be
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.'
32
Judge Kavanaugh's main critique of the Ray/Rose test was its focus.
13 3
According to Judge Kavanaugh, "[tihe Ray Court went off the rails . . . by
focusing on the subject matter of the underlying disciplinary proceeding-and
by applying a test that grants protection only when the investigation concerns a
Member's official conduct, as opposed to his or her personal conduct."' 134 To
him, the error in the court's test was made apparent in the comparison of the




129. Id. at 1206 n.2.
130. Id. at 1207.
131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1204
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
132. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1204-O5 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) ("In my
view, the answer is straightforward. Regardless whether the Member's underlying 'disorderly
Behaviour' is considered official or personal, the House or Senate's disciplinary proceedings are
official 'Proceedings' of the House or Senate. And a Member's speech in such an official
congressional proceeding constitutes 'Speech... in either House."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §
5, cl. 2 and § 6, cl. 1)).
133. Id. at 1206; see also D.C. Circuit Issues Speech or Debate Ruling in the Feeney Case,
supra note 16 (discussing "the incoherence of the Ray/Rose distinction").
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quite difficult to determine whether an allegation of wrongdoing involves
official or personal acts because the categories often overlap. This lack of
clarity proves to be a detriment to members of Congress because, in order to be
effective, "the scope of a privilege must be clear and predictable."' 37  Thus,
Judge Kavanaugh suggested that the Ray/Rose test is ripe for reconsideration
because it is inefficient, unclear, and unconstitutional.
III. MERGING THE MAJORITY AND CONCURRENCE
Although Judge Kavanaugh's objections to the Ray/Rose test highlight
several of its significant failings, his proposed holistic approach to the
legislative privilege is also flawed.1 38 The benefit of the Ray/Rose test is that it
strives to protect the balance of coordinate powers without tipping it in any one
direction. Because the test is unclear, however, it fails to achieve this goal
and has the potential to suffocate legislative independence. Conversely, the
benefit of Judge Kavanaugh's proposed rule is that it seeks to more faithfully
preserve the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause. 140 The proposed rule,
however, is also flawed because it expands the legislative privilege beyond the
scope set out in Supreme Court precedent.' 4' The Supreme Court has
demonstrated that the legislative privilege is not absolute; the determination of
legislative capacity or private action is the touchstone for providing or
withholding the benefits of the privilege.142 Because the Ray/Rose test does
not sufficiently defend legislative independence, and because Judge
Kavanaugh's proposal provides too much protection, the D.C. Circuit should
seek to create a test that spans the two.
A. Flaws in the Ray/Rose Test
Judge Kavanaugh's first objection to the Ray/Rose test is that it provides
insufficient protection of legislative independence. 143 Two problems with the
136. Id. To illuminate his point, Judge Kavanaugh gave the example of a member of
Congress who "is alleged to have abused his or her official position for personal gain." Id.
137. Id.
138. See More on Feeney and the Speech or Debate Clause, http://pointoforder.com/ (July 29,
2009, 8:58 EST) (agreeing with Judge Kavanaugh's concerns while doubting the appropriateness
of his approach).
139. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part II.B.
141. See More on Feeney and the Speech or Debate Clause, supra note 138 (suggesting that
testimony before an ethics committee might not be "in the Member's capacity as a Member (and
thus not 'an integral part' of the process by which Members 'participate in committee . ..
proceedings')" (alterations in original)).
142. See supra Part I.C.
143. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
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test subvert the sufficiency of its protection: (1) uncertainty 144 and (2) exposure
of the legislative branch.' 5
1. Uncertainty
The Ray/Rose test creates uncertainty by resting its analysis on opposing
decisions that have fairly similar fact patterns. 17 In determining whether
Representative Feeney was acting within the scope of his legislative capacity,
the court attempted to distinguish Ray from Rose. 4 7 However, the court's
determination that "the congressman's statements in this case were protected
because they were directly spurred by the inquiry into whether he had abused
his office to obtain a vacation" evinces a failure to distinguish Ray from
Rose. 148 On one hand, Representative Feeney's vacation was no less personal
than Representative Rose's financial actions, and on the other, the sought-after
material was no less responsive to the Ethics Committee than Senator
Proxmire's letter. 149 Thus, even though the court chose to rely on Ray, it is
unclear which of those two cases should control.
The analytical framework created by comparing these two cases is further
muddled by the lack of a clear vantage point. In Ray, the court based its
legislative-capacity determination on the nature of the contact between the
144. Id. ("[T]he Ray/Rose approach created great uncertainty. After all, it can be quite
difficult to determine whether an allegation of wrongdoing involves official or personal acts
because the categories often over-lap--for example, when a Member is alleged to have abused his
or her official position for personal gain.").
145. Id. ("'Like any privilege, the one that the Speech or Debate Clause grants to members of
Congress would be virtually worthless if courts judging its applicability had to scrutinize very
closely the acts ostensibly shielded, especially if those courts then had to balance the
considerations for and against extending privileged status."' (quoting TRIBE, supra note 4, at § 5-
20)).
146. See D.C. Circuit Issues Speech or Debate Ruling in Feeney Case, supra note 16 ("In
[Ray], the Member allegedly misused an official power for personal gain, while in [Rose] the
Member allegedly failed to perform an official duty for personal benefit. Why this makes a
difference for purposes of Speech or Debate protection is not explained by the Rose case."); see
also Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Quashes Subpoenas for Congressman's Testimony to the House
Ethics Committee-In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L.
REv. 564, 567 (2009) [hereinafter D.C. Circuit Quashes Subpoenas] (discussing the "purely
rhetorical" nature of the D.C. Circuit's Ray/Rose distinction); Note, Title VII and Congressional
Employees: The "Chilling Effect" and the Speech or Debate Clause, 90 YALE L.J. 1458, 1467-69
(1981) (discussing the "legislative inhibition" caused by the unclear scope of the Speech or
Debate Clause, and blaming that lack of clarity on the "breadth of the modem legislator's role").
147. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1203. The court contrasted the responsive
nature of Senator Proxmire's "'allegedly defamatory statement"' with Representative Rose's
statements "concem[ing] his 'personal loans' and 'personal financial transactions."' Id. (internal
citations omitted).
148. Id; see also D.C. Circuit Issues Speech or Debate Ruling in Feeney Case, supra note 16
(criticizing the distinction because "it is not at all obvious how one concludes that misuse of
Senate rooms is more 'official' than improper filing of financial disclosures").
149. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1203.
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Senator and the congressional committee. 150  By contrast, the court in Rose
based its determination on the nature of the alleged offense that led to the
committee hearing.151 In effect, the court took a snapshot of one runner during
warm-ups and a snapshot of another runner mid-race and compared their
running styles. Had the court decided to examine the action that led to the
investigation in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, it might have found that it was
personal in nature and therefore not protected; however, the court based its
decision on Representative Feeney's response to the Ethics Committee. 52 The
mutable nature of the court's inquiry leads to unpredictable results;153 the focal
point must be static in order to provide any level of certainty. 54
2. Exposure of the Legislative Branch
Beyond his concerns with the technical machinations, Judge Kavanaugh also
questioned the textual validity of the Ray/Rose test.155  In doing so, he
highlighted a common theme found in both In re Grand Jury Subpoenas and
Rayburn--exposure of the legislative branch to judicial review lessening the
protection afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause.
156
In Rayburn, the court found that the executive branch had violated the
Speech or Debate Clause even before the Justice Department used the evidence
it gathered from Representative Jefferson's office.1 5 7  The protection in
Rayburn is a logical extension of the groundwork laid in Gravel and Johnson,
in which the Supreme Court demonstrated that the Clause's scope extends
beyond mere protection of the words and processes of debate in either House
150. See Ray v. Proxmire, 581 F.2d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) ("In responding
to a Senate inquiry into an exercise of his official powers, Senator Proxmire was engaged in a
matter central to the jurisdiction of the Senate .... ").
151. See United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The testimony was not
addressed to a pending bill or to any other legislative matter; it was, instead, the Congressman's
defense of his handling of various personal financial transactions.").
152. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1203 ("[T]he congressman's statements in this
case are protected because they were directly spurred by the inquiry into whether he had abused
his office to obtain a vacation.").
153. Id. at 1206 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
154. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1998) ("An uncertain privilege, or
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying application by the courts, is little
better than no privilege at all."). But see D.C. Circuit Quashes Subpoenas, supra note 146, at 568
(noting that the courts should examine two static points-the underlying act and the act of
testifying before the Ethics Committee-to determine the applicability of the Speech or Debate
Clause). The article concludes that "[b]ecause a member is not carrying out his legislative
responsibilities when testifying before an ethics committee, but rather is acting as a witness with
respect to his conduct, a court must analyze the subject matter of the testimony before granting it
the Speech or Debate Clause's protections." Id. at 569.
155. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1206 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
156. Id; see also supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
157. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, Wash., D.C., 20515, 497
F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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to the very workings of the "modern legislative process.' ' 158 Following this
reasoning, an intrusion on the internal workings and products of this process
subverts the purpose of the legislative privilege. 5
When, as in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, a court issues a subpoena to a
sitting member of Congress, that court infringes on the member's
independence. Likewise, when a court requires that a member involve himself
in a judicial determination of the privileged nature of the information sought, it
infringes on that member's independence. Because the Ray/Rose test allows
this intrusion to occur before determining whether the Clause protects the
information in question, it does not adequately serve the goals of the Speech or
Debate Clause.
60
B. Flaws in Judge Kavanaugh 's Proposed Rule
Addressing the issues of clarity and effectuation, Judge Kavanaugh
suggested a simple rule: any communication between a sitting member of
158. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S.
169, 180 (1966). In Gravel, the Court extended the privilege to congressional aides. Gravel, 408
U.S. at 628-29. In Johnson, the Court found that the legislative privilege prohibited investigation
into the underlying motivations behind a speech. Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180. These cases
recognize that the job of a legislator is not confined to the legislative floor; rather, what happens
there is the product of investigation, communication, and preparation. See Celia, supra note 7, at
34 (discussing the need for the legislative privilege to evolve in light of the need of "[m]odern
legislatures... to adopt their techniques of operation to the increasingly complex society within
which they must function"). But see Letzkus, supra note 3, at 1395-96 (arguing that the D.C.
Circuit extended the scope of the legislative privilege far beyond the scope of the Speech or
Debate Clause). Letzkus argued that the D.C. Circuit "should have relied on general separation
of powers principles rather than focusing on the Speech or Debate Clause to justify its decision in
the Jefferson case." Id. at 1396. In making such an argument, Letzkus glosses the difference
between a legislative privilege created by the separation of powers and that enumerated by the
Speech or Debate Clause. See Johnson, supra note 83, at 573. For a discussion of the Court's
decision to expand the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause instead of supplementing a limited
view with a common law immunity, see The Scope of Immunity, supra note 54, at 384
(concluding that the Court's decision limited its flexibility).
159. Celia, supra note 7, at 34. As the Rayburn court noted: "exchanges between a Member
of Congress and the Member's staff or among Members of Congress on legislative matters may
legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the possibility of compelled disclosure
may therefore chill the exchange of views with respect to this legislative activity." Rayburn, 497
F.3d at 661. But see Recent Cases, D.C. Circuit Holds that FBI Search of Congressional Office
Violated Speech or Debate Clause-United States v. Rayburn House Office Building 497 F.3d
654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), Reh'g En Banc Denied, No. 06-3015, 2007 US. App. Lexis 26295 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 9, 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 914, 919 (2008) [hereinafter FBI Search of Congressional
Office] ("The Rayburn court.., ignored [separation of powers] concerns in narrowly focusing on
legislative independence as an end in itself, rather than as a means toward the end of preserving
the separation of powers structure established in the Constitution." (citation omitted)).
160. See TRIBE, supra note 4, § 5-20 ("Put simply, we'd better make sure we don't so
thoroughly question and probe each 'speech or debate' in asserting its privileged status that by the
time the member's ordeal is over, being told that the privilege applies after all would be
anticlimactic.").
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Congress and a congressional committee is protected by the Speech or Debate
Clause. 61 Like the Ray/Rose test, Judge Kavanaugh's rule is flawed; however,
unlike the Ray/Rose test, it is the rule's simplicity which dooms it. In
attempting to establish an absolute privilege in the context of congressional
ethics committee hearings, Judge Kavanaugh's proposal fails to take into
account the complexities of the situation. 62 For example, the Supreme Court
has recognized the potential for corruption and injury that stems from placing
members of Congress above the law.' 63 Thus, there are two major flaws in
Judge Kavanaugh's rule: (1) it fails to adequately take into account Supreme
Court precedent and (2) it fails to consider the relationship between the
testifying member of Congress and the committee.'64
1. Precedent
Although the Supreme Court has read the Speech or Debate Clause broadly,
it has not granted members of Congress total immunity.1 65  In Gravel, the
Court set legislative capacity as a hard line for invoking the privilege and, by
doing so, the Court demonstrated its unwillingness to allow the legislative
privilege to shield legislators completely. 66 Providing a total shield would
likely give legislators complete independence from both the executive and the
judiciary branches. In such a system, political consequences and legislative
161. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (concluding that, under Gravel, testimony before a congressional committee should
be protected because when a member participates in such an inquiry he "not only engages in
Speech or Debate in either House but also, by definition, takes part in communicative processes
with respect to matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of the House"
(internal quotations omitted)). Judge Kavanaugh relies on Congress's power to sanction its
members under Article I, Section 5, to protect any speech before a congressional ethics
committee. Id.
162. See More on Feeney and the Speech or Debate Clause, supra note 138 (suggesting that
the issue is more complex than Judge Kavanaugh portrays); see also John D. Pingel, Note, Do
Congressmen Still Pay Parking Tickets? The D.C. Circuit's Overextension of Legislative
Privilege in United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1621,
1643-44 (2009) (arguing that the court's extension allows legislators to use the privilege to
protect personal material simply by co-mingling it with legislative material); FBI Search of
Congressional Office, supra note 159, at 918-19 (disagreeing with the court's decision to extend
an absolute privilege in the context of criminal cases and arguing that "separation of powers
principles do not demand the absolute privilege the court conferred").
163. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 316-17 (1973) (explaining that granting an
unlimited privilege "would be to invite gratuitous injury to citizens for little if any public
purpose"); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972) (arguing that the privilege cannot
be applied in such a manner as "to make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from
criminal responsibility"); see also The Scope ofImmunity, supra note 54, at 385-86 (recognizing
"the courts' own interest in reconciling control of aberrant conduct by individual legislators or
staff members with a healthy respect for a coordinate branch of government").
164. See More on Feeney and the Speech or Debate Clause, supra note 138.
165. See supra Part I.C.
166. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
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censure would replace judicial punishment. 167 In recognizing the dual nature
of legislators as both politicians and citizens, the Supreme Court has rejected
an interpretation that provides a total shield for legislators.
168
2. Relationship Between a Testifying Member and the Committee
Judge Kavanaugh urged the D.C. Circuit to end its inquiry as soon as it
determined that the subpoenaed testimony was given in an official
proceeding.' 69  He reasoned that because congressional ethics committee
hearings take place pursuant to the power granted to Congress by Article I,
Section 5, "a Member's speech in such an official congressional proceeding
constitutes Speech . . . in either House.' 170  This interpretation fails to
recognize the position of the legislator in the hearing-whether he is giving or
receiving the testimony in question. The distinction is important because only
matters that are "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings"
are placed by the Constitution "within the jurisdiction of either House."'
171
Thus, the difference between members of the committee and individuals who
are the subject of the inquiry should require a differing application of the
Speech or Debate Clause.
2
The members of the committee, when they are inquiring into alleged
violations and determining punishment, are full participants in a process
"place[d] within the jurisdiction of either House." 73 As the subject of the
process, the member being investigated is distinct from the members of that
committee. If the committee investigates a member for actions taken outside
the scope of his legislative capacity, its investigation is of the private
167. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 518 (noting that in the absence of judicial inquiry, Congress
would retain a constitutional power to sanction its members); see also Comment, Brewster,
Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125, 152 n. 181 (1973) (commenting that
members of Congress may be sanctioned by the legislative branch if the Speech or Debate Clause
barred judicial inquiry).
168. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624-25 (noting
the privilege's outer limit).
169. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring). Judge Kavanaugh could find some support from Justice Douglas's dissent in Gravel,
which concluded that the judiciary could only exercise a supervisory function over the
introduction of a document before a committee where "a witness before a committee is
prosecuted for contempt and he makes the defense that the question he refused to answer was not
germane to the legislative inquiry or within its permissible range." Gravel, 408 U.S. at 635
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
170. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d at 1205 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (internal
quotations omitted). Judge Kavanaugh added that not only would the oral testimony itself be
protected, but the written communications would be as well. Id. at 1205 n. 1.
171. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.
172. See infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
173. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.
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individual and not the representative. 74 The Ethics Committee itself must be
protected to ensure that it carries out its task free of the encumbrance of the
executive or judicial branch. 175 The member appearing before the committee,
however, needs no such independence-if the member would not otherwise be
able to claim the privilege, it is illogical to grant him that privilege simply
because he is called before a congressional committee.
176
C. The Power to Determine
Judge Kavanaugh does not suggest that members of Congress can never be
hailed before a court.' 7 7 The dangers of such an interpretation are not difficult
to imagine; however, such an extensive privilege has never existed, even under
the broad English privilege.178 Judge Kavanaugh's rule appears to grant the
legislature a judicial function. Although it is true that the houses of Congress
already exercise a judicial function under Article I, Section 5, this function is
limited in its scope in four ways: (1) Congress is not designed to serve a
judicial function; (2) forcing Congress to establish the required standards
would severely damage the balance of powers; (3) Congress's power to punish
is limited; and (4) such a function would impose a great responsibility on a
174. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966) (refusing to extend the
Speech or Debate Clause to private acts). But see The Scope oflImmunity, supra note 54, at 372
(describing the Johnson Court as having a "seemingly cavalier attitude toward any possible claim
of immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause").
175. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975). In Eastland, the Court
recognized that "[t]he power to investigate and to do so through compulsory process plainly falls
within" the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 504. However, the D.C. Circuit found
that Eastland's protection of investigating committee members was limited, holding that the
Speech or Debate Clause protects an investigating committee member when: (1) the committee
has jurisdiction to perform the inquiry; and (2) the committee performs the inquiry by lawful
means. McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
176. See More on Feeney and the Speech or Debate Clause, supra note 138 ("Consider, for
example, an election contest held before the Committee on House Administration. Like
disciplinary proceedings, election contests are a judicial function exercised by each House of
Congress pursuant to explicit constitutional authority. Following [Judge] Kavanaugh's reasoning,
the testimony of an incumbent Member in an election contest would be protected by Speech or
Debate, while the testimony of the adverse party (i.e., the as yet unsuccessful challenger seeking
the Member's seat) presumably would not be. It would seem more logical, however, to treat the
two in the same fashion, reflecting the fact that both are in the same relationship, that of
party/witness, to the tribunal.").
177. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1205-07 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
Although Judge Kavanaugh never explicitly makes this assertion, his call is for the D.C. Circuit
to "resolve [the issues created by the Ray/Rose test] by looking to the text of the Speech or
Debate Clause," which seems to extend beyond the context of Ethics Committee hearings. Id at
1205. Because Ray, Rose, and In re Grand Jury Subpoenas each involved the attempted use of
Ethics or Standards Committee testimony, it seems logical that Judge Kavanaugh's concern is
limited to that context. On the other hand, it seems likely that Judge Kavanaugh would apply this
prospective reconsideration to any case where a house of Congress was exercising its jurisdiction.
Id. at 1207.
178. See Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 202-03 (1880).
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body that is already too overburdened to complete all of the business before
it.
17 9
In Brewster, the Court agreed that the houses of Congress have some power
to inquire into the action of their members, but noted Congress's judicial
incapacity.' 80  Reciting the powers enumerated by Article I, Section 5, the
Court commented that "Congress is ill-equipped to investigate, try, and punish
its Members for a wide range of behavior that is loosely and incidentally
related to the legislative process. ' 8  The Court found that "[t]he process of
disciplining a Member in the Congress is not without countervailing risks of
abuse since it is not surrounded with the panoply of protective shields that are
present in a criminal case."' 82  One such risk is that placing the power to
determine the applicability of the Speech or Debate Clause in the hands of
Congress "would enable a legislative majority to suppress dissent simply by
criminalizing conduct otherwise thought of as legislative."' 183  Even if such
inquiries were performed fairly, the members of Congress would not be
exclusively focused on the cases before them, and the body has no appellate
procedure.
Although it places the power to determine whether a member of Congress is
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause in the hands of the judiciary, a test
that allows courts to determine whether the conduct prompting a congressional
committee's inquiry is potentially illicit behavior is a necessity.1
84
179. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 518-19, 524 (1972); see also D.C. Circuit
Quashes Subpoenas, supra note 146, at 570-71 (noting the "institutional limitations" on
Congress's power to "police itself effectively").
180. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 518.
181. Id. The types of punishment at Congress's disposal are also limited. See Christopher
Beam, For Shame: How Many Ways Can Congress Punish Its Members?, SLATE, Sept. 16, 2009,
http://www.slate.com/id/2228586/?from=rss (describing the three forms of congressional
punishment in the wake of a House resolution "reprimanding Representative Joe Wilson for
shouting 'You lie!' during President Obama's address on health care").
182. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 519. The Constitution grants Congress the power to determine
"the Rules of its own Proceedings." U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 2. Although this might entail the
ability to adjudge whether a member acted in his legislative capacity, the uncertainty regarding a
member's continuation in office, as well as the political nature of the legislature and of
appointments to committees, serves to undermine Congress's power to adequately determine
whether speech or debate is privileged.
183. James Brudney, Congressional Accountability and Denial: Speech or Debate Clause
and Conflict of Interest Challenges to Unionization of Congressional Employees, 36 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 29 (1999). Professor Brudney further argues that "[w]hile Article I authorizes Congress
to inflict its own forms of discipline upon members it deems recalcitrant, that is a far cry from
exposing members to prosecution and punishment from the two other branches." Id. at 29-30.
184. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) ("To find that a committee's
investigation has exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a
usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or Executive."). This power would be
limited by the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III, Section 2, clause 1. But see Josh
Chafetz, Comment, Cleaning House: Congressional Commissioners for Standards, 117 YALE
L.J. 165, 167 (2007) (arguing that Congress, alone, should regulate the conduct of its members).
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D. A New Test
In order to combat the flaws in the Ray/Rose test, as well as those in Judge
Kavanaugh's proposed rule, the D.C. Circuit should adopt a test that minimizes
investigative infringement of legislative independence. A two-part test that
front-loads the determination of legislative capacity would provide such a
solution. This test would require the proponent of a warrant or subpoena to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the action on which the
suit is based was performed outside the member's legislative capacity and (2)
the information sought is integral to the suit for which it is to be used. 85 To
clarify further, the D.C. Circuit could define legislative capacity as the
Supreme Court did in Gravel.
186
This test would preserve the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause,
remain true to Supreme Court precedent, and clarify the subject of the inquiry.
This test would effectuate the purposes of the legislative privilege by limiting
intrusion in three ways. First, by requiring an investigator to show that the
information he seeks falls outside the member's legislative capacity, it keeps
the investigator and legislator separate to the greatest extent possible without
totally insulating the legislator. 187 Second, it limits potential intimidation by
placing an obstacle in the way of unfettered access. Third, it minimizes any
potential unnecessary, though arguably proper, intrusion by requiring some
level of necessity. Despite these protections, the test allows investigators to
Chafetz suggests that the houses of Congress should form their ethics committees "to improve
upon the British model," to increase effectiveness, and to shield itself from any intrusion by the
executive or judicial branches. Id. at 171-73. Chafetz's proposition, however, is flawed on many
levels. The Framers structured Congress to be different from Parliament; unlike Parliament,
Congress is not a court. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 518-19. Furthermore, "[t]he Constitution's
bill of attainder prohibition is an explicit and dramatic departure from the British tradition of
legislative punishment and impeachment." Victor Williams, Unconstitutional Bills of Attainder
or Valid Impeachment Convictions? The Walter Nixon and Alcee Hastings Impeachment Cases,
22 Sw. U. L. REV. 1077, 1098 (1993); see also Paul Thompson, First, Do No Harm: Why a
Commissioner on Standards is Unhealthy for the American Body Politic, 117 YALE L.J. 230,
232-34 (2008) (criticizing Chafetz's arguments).
185. Commentators have suggested the use of pre-trial showings to protect legislative
independence in the context of employment discrimination. See The Scope of Immunity, supra
note 54, at 3 87-88 (proposing a test to allow aggrieved constituents to sue members of Congress,
and suggesting that "[t]he new rule should contain the further limitation that the plaintiff must
have evidence of the defendant's malice before the trial begins"). The Supreme Court has used
this pre-trial determination in cases involving executive privilege. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 703-07 (1974).
186. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972) (defining legislative capacity as that
which is "an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members
participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places
within the jurisdiction of either House"); see also D.C. Circuit Quashes Subpoenas, supra note
146, at 567-68 (urging the D.C. Circuit to rely on the Gravel definition of legislative acts).
187. The D.C. Circuit demonstrated in Rayburn the need to keep these entities separate until
a decision is made. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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reach information that is not protected by the Clause. 188  Perhaps most
importantly, the test provides a measure of certainty to litigants by clarifying
the focal point of the analysis.
Judge Kavanaugh would likely oppose such a test for a number of reasons.
First, although the test addresses a number of Judge Kavanaugh's concerns, it
does not address his underlying belief that a member testifying before a
congressional committee is participating in legislative activity.'89 Beyond this
concern, this test is also far less efficient than either the Ray/Rose test or Judge
Kavanaugh's proposed rule; because the test must be applied before disclosure,
it requires the parties to litigate an issue before discovery is completed. 190
Further, the early determination would likely lead to multiple rounds of
litigation regarding just the disputed material. 191 However, this preliminary
intrusion is minimal when compared to an FBI raid or a court-ordered
subpoena. 192 In other words, the intrusion caused by litigating the issue at such
an early stage is a necessary cost of maintaining the purposes of the privilege
while restricting the totality of its protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to maintain the balance of powers, the D.C. Circuit should create a
new test that strikes a balance between the goals of the Ray/Rose test and
Judge Kavanaugh's concerns. While the court should clarify the focus of its
analytical inquiry, its primary goal in creating a new test should be protecting
legislative independence while limiting a congressman's ability to use the
privilege as a shield for corruption.'
93
188. To complete the analysis, the D.C. Circuit would have to set out a test for what
constitutes legislative conduct. The court needs to look no further than Supreme Court precedent
to achieve this goal. Although the test does not expressly confront the concern of co-mingled
legislative and non-legislative documents, a provision such as that in Rayburn might solve that
issue. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., Room 2113, Wash., DC 20515, 497
F.3d 654, 663-64 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
189. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring). If that argument was dispositive, however, no test would be necessary because
anything presented before a congressional committee would be privileged.
190. In cases like Rayburn, the Department of Justice may be unwilling to do this because it
would tip its hand to the legislator.
191. This initial determination would not preclude re-litigation of a claim of privilege at a
later stage.
192. See supra notes 58-60, 108-15 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Part III.D.
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